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Preface
This paper has been prepared as an inaugural address to be presented
at The Institute of Social Studies in The Hague on 30 March 1995.
In preparing the paper I have been conscious of my debt to various
colleagues and collaborators, several of whom are mentioned by name
in the text. Here I would like to acknowledge Hans von Sponeck who
stimulated my work in Pakistan both in his capacity as the former
UNDP Resident Representative in Islamabad and, emerging from that,
as a friend. I would also like to express here my debt to my wife,
Shirley, for all her support.
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Introduction
While economists and others might disagree over the most appropriate
policies for stimulating development, there is at least some conver-
gence of-views on objectives. The appropriate means may be in doubt,
but the end that is commonly understood is to raise living standards on
a sustainable basis.
Regrettably, this agreed objective has become more difficult to achieve
in the aftermath of the debt crisis in the early 1980s. While there were
several important aspects to this crisis, two points in particular can
usefully be mentioned here. Firstly, the debt crisis marked the point ill
time at which the net transfer of resources from developed to develo-
ping countries started to decline. This transfer is now substantially
negative for many would-be recipients. Secondly, and not unrelated to
the first point, it was also at about this time that real interest, rates
increased sharply as a direct result of a shift in the macroeconomic
policies adopted in the developed world. This brought to an end an era
in which debtor nations could rely on inflation to amortize their obli-
gations to service debt.' There has, therefore, been a major structural
change in the context within which the developing countries are now
attempting to raise the living standards of their people. Under the new
regime, debts are more difficult to payoff, which implies that the
premium on export earnings and private direct investment as preferred
sources offoreign exchange has increased. In other words, the balance-
of-payments constraint on development has tightened for most coun-
tries.
It was in this relatively more hostile environment that, at some point
during the 1980s, many countries were obliged to embark on structural
adjustment and stabilization programmes as orchestrated by the Bretton
Woods institutions. Growth ground to a halt, and became negative in a
number of countries, not because of the programmes themselves but
because of the external imbalance to which they responded. Living
standards suffered accordingly, so that the 1980s have been referred to
as a 'lost decade' in the questto reduce poverty.' Indeed, the proportion
of the world's people who are poor has probably risen, while the
absolute number has almost certainly increased.' Moreover, the gap
between the richest and poorest countries has grown rapidly and con-
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tinues to do so. The world has become less equal over the past decade
and the differences are increasing." In this technical sense, ifno other,
the situation is explosive.
Since the poor of the world are the last among those who might be
blamed for the balance-of-payments problems that their countries have
encountered, it seems less than fair that they should have to share in
the costs of re-establishing economic viability. An influential book,
Adjustment with a humanface, published in 1987 on behalfofUNICEF,
signalled this injustice and, in doing so, made the point that the cost of
maintaining the fragile safety nets which some poor countries could
previously afford would be a small price to pay for the poor's protec-
tion.5 By the same token, protection of the basic services enjoyed by
the poor would be unlikely to jeopardize in any serious way the elimi-
nation ofthe fiscal deficits which had led governments to borrow in the
first instance. Moreover, it is argued that the longer-term prospects for
development, which depend crucially on the health and education of
children, should not be sacrificed for the sake of short-term economic
stability. Hence the Bretton Woods institutions in particular have been
pressured to reaffirm the importance for development of the social
dimension, and to strive for- a more appropriate balance between econ-
omic and social concerns in the determination of policy. Perhaps the
most visible expression of these concerns has been the annual publica-
tion, beginning in 1990, ofa Human Development Report (HDR) by the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which serves as a
point of reference for much of the current debate on appropriate
strategies.f Less well known is a set of four country studies which were
commissioned by UNDP to articulate at country level some of the
concerns that were being expressed in the HDRs. I was responsible for
one ofthese studies, the report on which has been published in summary
form under the title Balanced development: an approach to social
action in Pakistan.'
The work undertaken in Pakistan with various colleagues" served to
reinforce my concern that many of the issues which are crucial for
human development lie beyond the scope of standard economic ana-
lysis and the existing calculus of costs and benefits. There were then
two options. One was to extend the range ofthat calculus by building
on a number of basic economic concepts, notably the gross domestic
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product and human capital, so as to embrace a wider range of issues. I
will refer to this option as the supply side approach. The other possi-
bility was to accept the limitations of existing theory and to argue the
cause of human development as being worthwhile in its own right. I
will call this alternative the demand side approach.
In opting for the supply side, I was well aware that my choice was
controversial. Equally, I think it was the right choice to make and, in
the final section of this paper, I will elaborate on my reasons. For the
present it may suffice to note that an important concern at the time was
to invoke the prima facie case for donor support of social sector
projects or reforms which could be shown to be attractive when costs
and benefits were computed with reference to appropriate market or
shadow prices." Not least, the need for a shift of the aid budget from
physical to human capital investment might be promoted more effec-
tively within such a conceptual framework, with the alternative being
to have to rely on the arguable merits of such a proposal in the specific
context of Pakistan.
This need to strike the right balance between policies, projects and
reforms which are often, and somewhat misleadingly, classified as
being either 'economic' or 'social' explains why the title Balanced
Development was chosen for the report on Pakistan. It was, therefore,
a happy coincidence to discover subsequently that this same expression
was being used in this same sense more than thirty years ago within the
United Nations. In particular, the 1961 Report on the World Social
Situation was subtitled as being 'with special reference to the problem
of balanced social and economic development' and a special study of
the subject was presented as Part II of that document.l''
This coincidence and the intrinsic interest of the arguments presented
might have been sufficient reasons for devoting a section ofthe present
paper to the various findings of this 1961 UN study, following the
introduction in the next section of some extensions of the economic
calculus which respond to my concern that a supply side approach
should be developed. However, the case for discussing the 1961 docu-
ment becomes irresistible once it is appreciated that the study reported
in Part II ofthat document sets out many ofthe arguments that are now
being invoked as intellectual foundations ofthe HDRs. I I Moreover, the
proposed resolution ofcertain methodological or research issues which
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arise in an attempt to identify what a human development strategy
might look like are much the same in the two cases. Accordingly, there
~ are two related versions of the demand side approach to be considered,
and an attempt is made in section 2 below to do justice to the point of
view they represent.
In the final section of this paper, section 3, I will try to reconcile the
demand and supply side approaches and to elaborate on the sense in
which they are mutually supportive. From my personal perspective, I
find no difficulty in this. But I cannot speak for those who champion
the demand side. For them the extensions ofeconomic theory which are
to be discussed in the next section may well be regarded as an unwar-
ranted intrusion into the domain of humanist concerns.
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1. Towards an extended calculus of costs and benefits
There is a very large literature criticizing the use of national income
statistics in various contexts, not least as a measure of development.12
Much of this can be traced back to Hicks (1942) who suggested that the
national income was a measure not only of production but also of
welfare. In my opinion this is not helpful and I prefer to regard the
national accounts as being first and foremost a framework for recording
the gross domestic product, preferably in the form of a social account-
ing matrix (SAM), which identifies all the different institutions in
society and sets out exhaustively all the transactions between them.
Institutions in this context refer not only to individuals, who may be
clustered into socio-economic groups, but also to the corporate sector,
government itself and the various non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) which, taken together with individuals, constitute the society
as a whole..With this as the starting point, the main difficulty which
then remains is to decide which transactions to include in the matrix
and which, if any, to ignore.
Most ofthe criticism which remains, once any claim to measure welfare
has been dismissed, focuses on the fact that the domestic product
accounts, as we might now call them, are largely confined to a record
of transactions that are intermediated with money. Hence the gross
domestic product as we know it is essentially a measure of the size of
the monetary economy which leaves out of account most of the activity
which takes place in the non-monetized sector. It has been argued,
strenuously on occasion and with some merit, that this omission intro-
duces a gender bias into the accounts which various authors have
attempted to correct in more or less ad hoc ways.13
The most important omissions from the national product accounts of
most countries are the goods and services (other than food) which are
privately produced for personal consumption by a combination of
domestically-owned durables (other than housing) and the time which
is spent privately in producing them by members of the family. This
means that no value is put on leisure nor on the role of families in
raising children, caring for the sick or feeding the work-force.
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One way of responding to these limitations is to impute some value
(related to opportunity cost) to some of the individual items which are
not otherwise recorded in the domestic product accounts. Another
approach, which is ultimately the only one which can be satisfactory,
is to recognize all time and household assets as being valuable re-
sources which have a shadow price or opportunity cost. The extension
ofthe domestic product accounts which is then called for is a complete
statement of time use and the employment of consumer durables irre-
spective of whether or not their product is marketed. What I am sug-
gesting, then, is a matrix accounting for all monetary transactions as
the starting point and for this to be expanded by covering non-mone-
tized transactions also in a complete accounting for all uses of scarce
resources, in which the resources themselves are valued consistently at
their opportunity cost.l"
This radical approach has many far-reaching implications, one ofwhich
is that it leads to a very different view of what value added might be
and where it is created. The economy must now be seen as having two
'halves' which mal be comparable in magnitude and these are linked,
one with another.' One of the halves is the monetized,economy where
goods and services are bought and sold, and the other is the non-mon-
etary economy where goods and services are freely exchanged between
individuals, typically within the same household. The supply of labour
to the market is one important feature of the interface between these
two parts. Another is the purchase of goods and services for what the
conventional accounts refer to as final consumption. Given these links,
of which the two mentioned are perhaps the most important, it follows
that it cannot be sufficient to analyse what goes on in the monetary
economy in order to understand the supply of labour as conventionally
defined or the level of living standards: it is necessary to look into the
non-monetary economy also in order to understand, for example, how
price reforms or new incentives might influence behaviour, or the way
in which structural adjustment affects poverty.
To articulate these concerns and to give substance to this approach, the
standard model of consumer behaviour must be developed in several
respects, building on Becker (1965) for the analysis oftime use and by
regarding the household as being simultaneously a consuming and
producing unit.!" In this framework leisure is a legitimate use of time
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which has a value that is based on its opportunity cost. And the supply
of labour to the market is an intermediate output of the household and,
therefore, not final. Similarly, wages are no longer a contribution to
value added, but leisure is.
The purchase of consumer durables is one way of introducing a dy-
namic element into this re-formulation ofhomo oeconomicos. Another,
which is more interesting, is with reference to human capital.
The standard formulation of human capital, based mainly on Becker
(1964), regards education and training as the relevant investments, with
the subsequent improvement in actual and expected earnings being the
measure of benefits. A more general approach is needed for our pur-
poses and this can be developed as follows. The individual is, among
other things, an embodiment of human capital created, in the first
instance, by an investment in reproduction which mayor may not be
enhanced subsequently through education, training or learning-by-
doing. It then follows that, in order to capture this construction, the
notion ofinvestment in human capital must be extended to include the
resource costs of a live birth, not the least ofwhich are the risks to the
mother of having a child. The gross return to this investment can now
be defined as the value of an individual's time, however used, and
should not be restricted to that part of the day, if any, during which the
services of human capital are rented out for wages. The net return to
investment in human capital is then obtained by subtracting from the
gross return the opportunity cost ofmaintaining human capital, in other
words, the necessary cost of maintaining the current and future poten-
tial of human capital. To adopt an alternative vocabulary, maintenance
costs can be interpreted as the costs of satisfying basic needs and
include the necessary allocation of time for rest and sleep!",
This reformulation of individual behaviour can be enriched by allowing
the utility of individuals to be interdependent, which then provides a
motivation for the non-requited transfers which dominate the transac-
tional relationships within a family. The reformulation admits a rich
variety ofindividual behaviour and has some far-reaching implications.
Two examples may suffice to illustrate this point.
If the satisfaction ofbasic needs is to be interpreted as the maintenance
of human capital, then the cost of meeting basic needs represents
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intermediate consumption, not final, and is not, therefore, a part of
value added. Hence, all basic needs should be exempt from value added
tax. More generally, the argument that a value added tax is attractive
because it is neutral breaks down if the definition of value added to
which the tax is applied is not the correct one. In the approach being
presented here it is implicit that production is being (re)formulated as
output that is generated via the services of physical and human capital,
both of which must be maintained.P This symmetric treatment has
much to commend it. In Pyatt (l992a) it is shown to imply that value
added will be equal to profits as we know them plus a return to domestic
durable goods plus the value of time that is not absorbed by sleep and
other maintenance activity. In other words, value added is being re-
defined as a measure of the surplus that is generated by economic
activity. To the extent that the distribution of this surplus is heavily
skewed towards the rich, with the poorest getting nothing, a progressive
income tax emerges as being more neutral than a value added tax (VAT)
since VAT as 'we know it is levied on what I am now suggesting is an
inappropriate measure of the gross domestic product.
Further illustrations of the way in which the proposed reformulation
suggests new policy perspectives can be developed in relation to main-
tenance and subsistence. One point which can be made immediately is
that the case for giving priority to the satisfaction of basic needs now
emerges as a candidate for being among the best options for use' of
available funds from a supply-side point ofview.'? This is because help
to those families that cannot meet their basic needs is likely to have a
high pay-off for all of the same reasons that have been invoked for
raising wages on the basis ofefficiency theory. Individuals who are too
poor to maintain themselves properly will be better placed to earn more
if better fed. A further implication of this reformulation has a direct
bearing on population policy. A subsistence household can be defined
as one which generates little or no surplus over and above that which
is required to reproduce itself. Since the return to human capital invest-
ment is measured through the surplus generated, the absence of any
such surplus implies a zero economic rate of return to investment in
reproduction for subsistance households. I do not interpret this result
as Malthus might have advised but rather as a useful starting point in
making a case for supplying contraceptives to those who want them by
investing in clinics, advisory and distribution services, etc..
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Optimal maintenance, both ofourselves and any physical assets we may
own, is one ofthe conditions for achieving production efficiency which
follows from the proposed reformulation of individual behaviour and
motivation. Such conditions can, in turn, be derived from the conditions
under which a Pareto optimum might be achieved. It follows that the
proposed reformulation is not inconsistent with the standard case for
free trade, perfect competition, control of monopolies, etc. There is,
therefore, no inherent conflict between what is being proposed here and
the standard prescriptions of public finance. For example, the control
of pollution through indirect taxation remains a part of the first best
solution. And, because time is to be recognized as a resource, corre-
sponding arguments will now extend to those externalities which con-
stitute congestion: these too, should be taxed.2o
.The control of externalities, preferably through taxation, is one way in
which the proposed reformulation suggests that balance between econ-
omic and social concerns might be achieved. More important, possibly,
is the fact that the complementarity of human .and physical capital in
generating most types of output (but not leisure) will imply that invest-
ment ill' both is likely to be necessary for intertemporal efficiency.
Strict complementarity is not implied here since the criterion for decid-
ing on which investments to pursue should be the net present value of
each particular use of funds, not the amount of funds which might
otherwise be allocated to particular types of investment. And here it
can be noted that environmental conservation and reclamation projects
can be included in the portfolio mix according to the familiar calculus
of costs and benefits. In this sense the balanced development approach
is able to embrace each of land, labour and capital in a symmetric
reformulation of production possibilities and efficiency. The conclu-
sions this leads to, as indicated previously, are neither radical nor
surprising. Rather, the main consequence of this reformulation is to
provide a more general framework for analysis which generates support
from the supply side for policies which previously depended on the
strength of ad hoc arguments and common sense.
We can go further, since the comprehensive treatment of time use
which is the essential element in the proposed reformulation implies
that, at least conceptually, all activities which involve human agency
can be included within the framework. In principle, therefore, those
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activities which are involved in the maintenance and improvement of
existing institutions or the creation of new ones, the drafting of new
legislation or the policing ofwhat now exists, can all be understood as
contributions to the creation and maintenance of the fabric of society.
Indeed, the maintenance of good governance is likely to be one of the
very best uses 'of scarce resources in any society, while the promotion
of the NGO sector may be an important second best alternative, to be
pursued in those cases where governments cannot be relied upon.
Indeed, the development of the NGO sector has a strong claim to being
part of the first-best solution. Thus Banuri et al. (1994) promote the
need for just such social capital formation within the new paradigm of
sustainable human development that UNDP has recently adopted as the
organizing concept for many of its activities. They make a clear case
for maintaining social capital as defined and investing in its restoration
and extension, drawing on the analogy between social capital and all
other types of assets. In this they were able to build on the case for
improved governance in Pakistan which was a particular feature of the
Balanced Development Report cited above. That report may have
placed less reliance on NGOs as a vehicle for social development than
Banuri et al. might have wished, but it was deeply engaged in the
substance of local government reform and the need for new institutions
to make effective contact with people who are otherwise marginalized
in their settlements and villages.
The fabric of society (or social capital) and social accounting are
closely linked. The institutions ofsociety define the structure ofa SAM
in the first instance, while the effectiveness of these institutions, in-
cluding the networks which connect them, are critical determinants of
the flows which take place, not only in the monetized economy, but
equally in the private world ofnon-monetary transactions. It is in this
context that the relevance of the household as an efficient vehicle for
the generation of individual opportunities and freedoms should be seen.
Its ability to function will then depend inter alia on having access to
public services, labour markets, etc. Accordingly, there are important
complementarities between human, physical and social capital that a
balanced development strategy will want to exploit.
From the perspective of public finance, the services rendered by social
capital are public goods which do not, therefore, have a market value.
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But in theory, at least, this does not preclude the possibility of identif-
ying the optimal level at which public goods (or services) should be
provided. Conceptually, therefore, the balanced development approach
can be extended to include them. Which is not to deny that, in practice,
decisions to invest in the creation of social capital may well have to be
made oil the basis of a more commonsense evaluation of the extent to
which, for example, an involvement in local politics is a constructive
use of time.
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2. A view from the United Nations, circa 1960
and again in 1990
The point was made in the introduction to this paper that there is a
striking continuity from the view of balanced development expressed
in Part II ofthe 1961Report on the World Social Situation to the annual
series of HDRs, the publication of which began in 1990. I therefore
propose, in this section of the paper, to set out, firstly, the general line
of argument which is developed in the earlier UN study and then to
supplement this with reference to the more recent analysis offered by
the HDRs themselves and, more particularly, the contribution ofAnand
and Sen (1994a) to a series of Occasional Papers which support the
annual HDRs.
The starting point for the (unknown) authors of the UN study is to
emphasize the various ways in which economic and social development
are interlinked. They begin with the proposition that the 'importance
of economic development as a means to social ends' is well known and
can be taken as being more or less self-evident The complementary
argument, that social development is important for economic growth,
is then developed in stages, the first of which is to note how social
factors can impede such growth in various ways. The potential ob-
stacles are elaborated under three headings: (i) population growth; (ii)
institutional factors, such as a caste system; and (iii) individual factors,
which are defined to include motivations and attitudes, not least in
relation to savings and entrepreneurship. Set against these potential
obstacles are the many positive ways in which social development
expenditures can support economic growth, with the primary example
being investment in human capital (which was then, and still is, treated
as consumption, not investment, in conventional national product ac-
counts). Health and education are singled out for special mention in
this connection and it is suggested that there is no adequate way of
distinguishing the economic benefits of such expenditures as distinct
from their social implications. The report indicates that it would be
(extremely) difficult to define the size of the eventual economic returns
froma sewage disposal scheme or the building of a hospital (United
Nations 1961: 33) and that 'The possible contribution of [a] school to
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material production is beyond measurement at the present time but not
beyond conception' (United Nations 1961: 35).
Today, some thirty years on, it may be realistic to express somewhat
greater optimism over the prospects for measuring the economic
benefits 'of a school. Indeed, it is precisely that possibility which has
been invoked in the previous section of this paper in suggesting that a
calculus of costs and benefits can be developed to cover a wide range
of economic and social activity. But such optimism is ultimately not
essential for the point of view, I want to argue here. For that, it is
sufficient that such a calculus of economic costs and benefits is 'not
beyond conception' to quote the study, since it is the conceptual basis
of a human development strategy which is my main concern. The
possibilities that now exist for illustrating my case can only serve to
strengthen it. And there are, of course, many of these in the fields of
health, education and the environment.
But this is not the end of the story since the authors of the 1961 UN
report were evidently worried about something other than the technical
difficulties of cost-benefit analysis. Specifically; they were concerned
that precise knowledge ofthe interactions and independencies between
economic and social variables 'will not fully indicate what the pattern
of development ought to be, because questions of value also come in -
the value to be placed upon, say, education for its own sake' (United
Nations 1961: 38; emphasis added).
Faced with this undeniably reasonable proposition, the question of
what to do about it cannot be avoided. There seem to be several
possibilities. One would be to proceed, nonetheless, to conceptualize
the problem of computing economic costs and benefits. Back in 1961,
this might not have appeared as an attractive option, since the necessary
theoretical developments were only just beginning to emerge. It is a
realistic option today, however, and will be referred to here as the a
priori approach. A second approach, which is hinted at in the UN study,
is to set targets: 'the concept of balanced development clearly means
for most people who use the term, an appropriate relation between
economic and social factors - giving to each field or sector of develop-
ment the attention it des~.r;vesJ:ir. the total complex. It thus implies in
the first instance a valu~pfg'6a:l~:·:s_omething to be sought (even if only
dimly perceived)' (Un@d Natio~~~;~961:37) This, then, is an argument
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for pursuing a target approach as discussed in Kaul and Menon (1993).
A third approach is to set aside the economics of scarce resources and
to explore the actual experience of countries, looking for patterns in
• the data in an attempt to identify from the data themselves what actually
seems to work and what does not. We can refer to this third possibility
as the empirical approach.
In opting for the empirical approach, the 1961 UN report provides an
illuminating analysis of the relationship between gross domestic pro-
.duct and various social indicators such as infant mortality, life expec-
tation, school enrolment, calorie intake, etc. With due respect to the
limitations of these data, various outliers are identified. For example,
exceptionally good school enrolment ratios, relative to the gross do-
mestic product, are noted for Ireland, Japan, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and
Thailand, with a correspondingly poor performance being recorded for
Venezuela and Cuba. Similar results in relation to infant mortality show
Greece, Japan and Taiwan as doing well, while Chile and the former
Borneo join Venezuela and Cuba as poor performers.
Investigation ofthe correlations which exist between various indicators
and of the outliers which can be-'identified by such analysis is sup-
plemented in the UN report by an exploration, for many of the same
countries, of public expenditure patterns for the social sectors, mainly
with reference to health, education and housing. A limitation of the
analysis here is a failure to explore the extent to which the outliers
previously identified might be explained by levels ofpublic and private
expenditure. But this would have been a very difficult undertaking in
practice, since a functional classification of public expenditures was
not available for many of the countries concerned, while household
survey information on private expenditures was similarly scarce or
non-existent. The analysis has many points of interest, nonetheless,
including the authors' conclusion that there was little evidence in their
data of defence expenditure crowding out the social sectors.
These various analyses were undertaken in the 1961 UN study on the
basis that:
The standard of living of a population - or, better, the
'level of living' - must be regarded as a set ofcomponents
(health, nutrition, education, housing, employment condi-
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tions, etc.) which cannot be reduced to a single index.
Insofar as the level of living is measurable, it must be
expressed, not as a single quantity, but as a pattern of
non-convertible quantities. The fact that the level of living
is not to be defined as per capita national income does not
deny, however, the underlying importance of growth of
national income for the improvement of welfare.
It follows from the above that it is impossible to say on
any systematic grounds what a country's level in health,
education, or other social component should be, given its
level of economic development; or, again, what percent-
age of its national income it should expend in these fields.
If an economically under-developed country is only one-
third literate and has only one third of its children in
school, there is no standard which will demonstrate that,
say, one-half of the people should be literate and one-half
of the children ill. school. Obviously, everyone should be
literate and all children should be in school. (United Na-
tions 1961: 38).
No doubt we can all agree to that. But the issue which concerns policy
today is not one of where we eventually want to be but of how to
proceed from where we are. It is in recognition of this practical need
to proceed on an incremental basis that the UN study makes its stron-
gest plea for the comparative study ofexperience in different countries:
If countries have a long historical experience in develop-
ment and a familiarity with the interactions of economic
and social factors, plus an educated population aware of
its needs and articulate about its values, and a leadership
skilled in the analysis of alternative proposals, then the
process of legislative debate and political decision may
well be adequate to deal with questions of balanced devel-
opment. But many less developed countries have no such
historical experience to guide them. (They lack most or all
of the above). In these circumstances Governments have
been interested in finding guidance in the experience of
other countries (United Nations 1961: 38-9].
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This, ultimately, is the argument for including an extensive range of
social and economic development indicators for all countries in each
~ edition of the lIDR, so that every measurable dimension can be con-
sidered in detail.
The combination of various economic and social indicators in a single
index, such as the Human Development Index (lIDI), is entirely another
matter, as is the question of how much new information might actually
be contained in the plethora of statistics which are published exten-
sively each year.21 As noted above, the UN study takes the view that
'in-so-far as the level ofliving is measurable, it must be expressed, not
as a single quantity, but as a pattern of non-convertible quantities'
presumably because there is no evident value system to suggest how
we should add together separate measures of the gross domestic pro-
duct, school enrolment and infant mortality. It is of some interest to
note, therefore, that, while Anand and Sen (l994a) support the views
on this point which are expressed in the 1961 UN study, the lIDI
methodology, as explained in Anand and Sen [1994b], flies in the face
ofthis logic. In an attempt to resolve this apparent contradiction, Anand
and Sen have suggested that:
the efficacy of (the lIDI) lies in providing an alternative
general focus of attention - alternative to the ubiquitous
GNP per capita. This is an exercise in presenting an alter-
native immediate view ofthe overall situation in a country
or a region - a situation that may be very badly reflected
by GNP statistics. On the other hand, to go beyond that
into a fuller analysis of the situation of human develop-
ment in that country or region, it is quite essential to step
over the lID! on to the more detailed informationprovided
in the HDRs (Anand and Sen 1994a: 18, emphasis
added)22.
Anand and Sen (l994a) are significantly more critical than the authors
of the 1961 UN study of the potential misuse of national income
statistics. The latter submit that:
the closest approach to a comprehensive measure ofecon-
omic and social development is the per capita national
income. (However, this) is not an adequate aggregate from
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a social point of view, and cannot be regarded as a satis-
factory comprehensive measure of social welfare (United
Nations 1961: 38).
This criticism is mild when compared with Anand and Sen (1994a: 17)
as quoted above, who go on to argue that:
the reliance on a standard measure of economic progress
such as the growth ofGDP not only specifies an evaluative
space (the world of commodities - irrespective of their
distribution and use) but also particular weights to be put
on the respective commodities. For example, the use of
market prices for the purpose ofweighting - in calculating
real income or real consumption - amounts to attaching
the same weight per dollar to the rich person's many
dollars as to the poor person's meagre means. .
This 'completeness' is often seen as an advantage of the
traditional GNP-centred measures of progress. Certainly,
it reduces the need for social values, but for the same
reason, it also eliminates the opportunity for conscious
social valuation ..... In contrast, the specification of an
evaluative space in the form of conditions of living, even
when supplemented by some indicators of economic
means such as the GNP, leaves the analyst the freedom to
decide what weights would be most appropriate for the
exercise in which he or she might be engaged. It is on this
major shift of the information focus that the rationale of
the human development approach has rested. (Anand and
Sen 1994a: 17, final emphasis added).
Two comments on these criticisms might be appropriate here. One
obvious point to make is that these are criticisms of the GNP as a
measure ofwelfare, and, as such, are directed at what I have previously
suggested is an inappropriate interpretation of measures of the domes-
tic product. They are not valid criticisms of GDP as a measure ofoutput
or of GNP as a measure of income generated by production. The
criticism amounts, therefore, to nothing more than a grumble over the
inappropriate use of particular statistics, not a critique of the statistics
per se. In constructing a measure of product, it is entirely appropriate
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that a banana should be counted as having the same value whoever
might eat it. A second more worrying point is that, the force with which
Anand and Sen present their case notwithstanding, there is no instance
that I am aware of within any of the lIDRs, that have been published to
.date, in which a particular problem is analysed using carefully-crafted
weights which have been deliberately chosen to illuminate the task at
hand. By implication, the 'opportunity for conscious social evaluation'
to replace market evaluation is one that the lIDRs have not as yet
exploited in practice, other than in the selection of subject matter and
supporting evidence. Nor is there any prospect that this opportunity
might be exploited in future, since the architects ofthe lIDRs commend
them as a 'reassertion of the classic humanist approach' (Anand and
Sen 1994a: 18) which is not a sufficient foundation on which to build
a system of measurement or even for identifying a strong ordering of
options. One must begin to worry, therefore, that not only does the lIDR
approach apparently reject a role for the market in generating informa-
tion which is a useful input into 'conscious social evaluation', of
resource costs, for example, but also that it is not leading to an alter-
native calculus of costs and benefits which can be used instead of
accounting prices.
Anand and Sen place great store in their analysis on the distinction
between means and ends and emphasize this by labelling a concern for
economic growth as 'the opulence approach', only to concede sub-
sequently that their characterization is less than fair. Similarly, they
castigate an exclusive concentration on people as 'human capital',
which would be relevant ifanyone was intent on doing that. Can we not
all agree that the sense in which people are an embodiment of human
capital is an aspect of their being, not the whole persona.?23 It would,
perhaps, be the only aspect that mattered to the owner of a slave, that
is, when freedom is denied. But, otherwise, freedoms are ofthe essence,
and one ofthe more constructive aspects ofthe paper by Anand and Sen
(1994a) is their rehearsal of the arguments for creating freedoms and
choices as the primary focus ofdevelopment policy, a theme which Sen
has been at pains to clarify over the years and one which has resonated
through all the lIDRs to date.
Another, less familiar theme concerns the question of sustainability,
and what we might mean by that. In developing their position, Anand
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and Sen (1994a) make the point that sustainability should not be
defined in such a way that no irreversible investment decisions can be
• made or that it is invariably wrong to deplete natural resources. In this
they invoke the support of Solow (1991) in arguing that what is at stake
is' a general. responsibility to maintain opportunities for future gener-
ations that are no less than those that we enjoy today, even though some
specific choices or freedoms may have been lost in the meantime. This,
ofcourse, begs the question ofdeciding on a value system which allows
one freedom or choice to be traded off against another since the
possibility of a weak ordering ofconsumption baskets is implicit in any
attempt to make this argument more precise. It also assumes something
about our understanding of nature, since we do not have complete
knowledge of what is being lost when a forest is converted to arable
land or whether such a process must always be irreversible.
A second point in the Anand and Sen formulation is that optimal growth
does not. guarantee sustainability. This also raises some difficulties,
since sustainable development is defined, for the purposes of their
demonstration, as an intertemporal growth path along which the first
derivative of a scalar measure of well-being is non-negative. It is
implicit, therefore, that a value system might exist according to which
the components of well-being can be added up. We are not told what
this value system might be, however.
Stepping over these difficulties (to borrow a phrase), the problem of
deciding what sustainability might mean operationally is addressed by
Anand and Sen as an aspect of their broader concern for universalism,
which they promote as an essential element of human development:
'the demand of sustainability is, in fact, a particular reflection of the
universality of claims - applied to the future generations vis-a-vis us.'
(Anand and Sen 1994a: 1). However, one should perhaps add that in
this case there is a particularly Rawlsian flavour to the argument since
there is an edge to the universality of claims which suggests that we
should be most concerned with whichever generation, including our
own, is likely to find itself in the most reduced circumstances. A
legitimate implication then seems to be that if one has great faith in
tec1mical progress, then perhaps we should worry less about the sustai-
nability of our life-styles. It is far from obvious that this is an area in
which humanist values are going to help, which is, perhaps, one of the
19
reasons why most of us are less sure about how we should react to
environmental concerns than we are about vegetarianism.
• If the problem of sustainability has to remain on the agenda of unre-
solved issues, this does not detract from the importance ofuniversalism
or, what I would prefer to call 'inclusivity', for the design of a human
development strategy. If we each care for one another and act on this
directly or through a social structure of caring institutions, then it is
apparent that anyone individual or group is less likely to be left out of
the development process and the chances of achieving growth with
equity are enhanced accordingly. It is also the case that societies which
marginalize a significant number oftheir members run the risk ofbeing
disrupted by violent means if the prevailing (democratic) institutions
are unable or unwilling to bring about whatever reforms may be necess-
ary to preserve social cohesion. There is a case, therefore, for the rich
to support the inclusion of the poor out of their own self-interest.
Concern for their welfare is essential for a healthy civil society, while
a lack thereof constitutes a significant failure ofpublic morality which
can, in its own time, result in the dissipation ofwhatever potential there
may otherwise have been for human development. History provides
numerous examples and it could be important to learn these lessons.24
The authors ofthe 1961 UN study note that the unique destiny of every
nation is to be charged with creating a future out of its own particular
past. But this should not, of course, preclude our learning the lessons
that can be gleaned from the history of others.
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3. Let all flowers bloom?
In a powerful critique of the HDRs, Srinivasan (1994) has pointed to
their divorce from standard methods of economic analysis, while Atu-
rupane et al. (1994) have emphasized the many policy areas in which
there is agreement between the HDRs, on the one hand, and the World
Bank on the other.25 In this final section I will make my own attempt
at a reconciliation.
A useful starting point is to note the general agreement on the potential
importance of an empirical approach, which offers the possibility for
one country to learn from the experience of another, and for all develo-
ping countries to learn from the history ofthose that are classified today
as being developed. But research in this area must break new ground if
this potential is to be realized. It must allow, for example, that Sri
Lanka might never have been an example that other countries either
could or should have wanted to folloW26 and that the reasons for
economic failure in Kerala are just as important as those which explain
its successes on the social front. The chances of achieving this deeper
understanding are slim for as long as analysis is confined to interna-
tional comparisons based on the unreliable data that are made readily
available by the multilateral development agencies.27 What is needed
most of all in this area is a series of studies in individual countries
which attempt to provide a robust explanation of some critical features,
such as the reduction of infant mortality, according to recognizable
sociometric techniques.
It is in moving from the empirical to the a priori that the philosophy
which underpins the HDRs might be seen as controversial. And this is
not because of the avowed humanist perspective. Rather, it is because
the 'humanitarians', as Streeton (1994) refers to those of like persua-
sion to himself, have no apparent place in their philosophy, as under-
stood from their writings, for notions of Pareto optimality and oppor-
tunity cost. Accordingly, they have some difficulty in engaging in
debate about the appropriate role ofthe market and entrepreneurship as
a driving force in development.
This is not a matter of the primacy of markets or private enterprise. It
is simply a matter of what role markets and private enterprise might be
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encouraged to play and where the limits of that role might properly be
located. In suggesting earlier some ways in which the boundaries of
economic analysis might be expanded with reference to time use, I am
attempting little more than to build some theoretical foundations to
support thesimilarities in UNDP and World Bank policy recommenda-
tions which have been noted by Aturupane et al. (1994). To the extent
that these foundations are built on notions ofconsumer sovereignty and
production efficiency, they are consistent with a broad class of social
welfare functions. It is well known, of course, that particular Pareto
optima may be irreconcilable with the current distribution of wealth
and power in anyone country. But it seems reasonable to infer that, if
UNDP had wanted to argue within the HDR that this is their main
concern in relation to most countries, then they would have done so by
now. And ifthis is not the main concern in most countries, then perhaps
it should be in some cases, of which Pakistan mayor may not be one.
Otherwise, in relation to countries in which the political preconditions
for human development are more firmly established, the problem of
deciding what the appropriate role for the market might be, given the
current distribution of power and wealth, calls for an answer in the
context of the Human Development Report because it is central to any
continuing effort to narrow the gap between the world as it is and the
world as it might be28.
In the preface to The Conditions ofEconomic Progress Clark (1936)
notes that, in relation to public affairs, economics is lexicographically
dominated by politics, which is in tum dominated by history and,
ultimately, by moral philosophy. It would, therefore, be wrong to take
economic theory too seriously: the last word belongs elsewhere. But it
would be equally wrong to infer from this proposition, which applies
to all theory in the social sciences, that the calculus of economics has
little to contribute. On the contrary, it sets an initial agenda that is
useful because it helps to identify those areas in which market forces
are in harmony with the concerns that all of us share for equity and
freedom. It therefore helps to define the areas in which consensus might
most easily be achieved. And economics is again useful when market
forces are in conflict with other, higher-value systems because, while
the economic calculus cannot tell us what the non-economic costs and
benefits of some particular policy might be, it is often the case that the
economic component is an important ingredient in decision-making.
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Thus, the opportunity cost of defence is usually an important consider-
ation in deciding how much defence expenditure to appropriate. In
other words, the economic calculus provides a first approximation to
what we might want to do that is often very useful.
In remaining ambiguous about the role of the market, the architects of
the Human Development Report may unwittingly have invited the risk
that economists could be tempted to extend the injunction to 'step over'
the Human Development Index to the Report as a whole. The issue
needs to be resolved because development is important. Hopefully, the
balanced development formulation of a supply-side approach which has
been outlined in this paper may be one way of proceeding towards a
resolution. In attempting to improve on the first approximation that can
be derived from the calculus, the approach may serve to advance the
debate over the best ways and means of achieving (sustainable human)
development.
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Notes
1. The critical condition is that the rate at which foreign exchange
earnings from exports are growing should be greater than the rate
of interest that has to be paid on debt.
2. In Pyatt (1991) the 1980s are characterized as a 'wasted' decade.
3. The latest evidence on this point is to be found in Chen et al.
(1994).
4. See the Human Development Report for 1992 (UNDP, annual
from 1990) for evidence on this point.
5. See Cornia et al. (1987).
6. See UNDP (annually from 1990).
7. See UNDP. (1992). Apart from Pakistan, the countries studied
were Bangladesh, Colombia and Ghana. For Bangladesh and
Colombia there are also reports available from UNDP which has
provided summaries of these and the Pakistan report as annexes
to Kaul and Menon (1993). Some of the ideas pioneered in these
studies have since reappeared in Griffin and McKinley (1994).
8. The team included at various stages Ataollah Amini, Lee Bean,
Dieter Berstecher, Tanguy de Biolley, Peter Bowden, Timothy
King, David Monro, Paula Newberg, Omar Noman and Abdel-
majid Tibouti. Tanguy de Biolley, Omar Noman and Timothy
King helped me in preparing the final draft.
9. This might be seen, therefore, as a somewhat belated response to .
the World Bank Vice-President who claimed never to have seen
a 'bankable gender project'.
10. See United Nations (1961). A subsequent document (United
Nations 1964) reported on six country studies which were under-
taken as a sequel to the 1961 report. The countries covered were
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India, The Netherlands, Poland, Puerto Rico, Senegal and
Yugoslavia.
.11. An important source for these foundations is, of course, the HDR
series itself. However, in some ways a better source is the
Occasional Paper series being issued by the HDR Office of
UNDP. One of these (Kaul and Menon 1993) has been referred
to above. Others of particular interest are Anand and Sen (1994
a and b). Yet another illuminating source is Streeton (1994).
12. Some highlights of this literature are Sametz (1968), Nordhaus
and Tobin (1972), Economic Council of Japan (1973), Eisner
(1978 and 1989), Kendrick (1979), Jorgenson and Fraumeli
(1989), Elson (1991) and Waring (1990).
13. Waring (1990) and Elsen (1991) have argued the general case.
Chadeau (1992) and Goldschmidt-Clermont (1992) discuss
possible corrections.
14. I argued this case for the first time in Pyatt (1990).
15. As yet there are no empirical studies which provide estimates of
the relative sizes of these two 'halves'.
16. Pyatt (1992a and 1994) set out somedetails ofthis reformulation.
17. Note, however, that the poor typically cannot afford to satisfy
their basic needs. Indeed, an inability to do so can be interpreted
as a definition of poverty.
18. This is an idea that has a long pedigree, going back at least to
Johnson (1964).
19. It is highly likely, if not certain that, from a demand-side point
of view, one would want to raise transfers to the poor if the
elimination of poverty is the immediate priority.
20. See Pyatt (1993) for an elaboration of the fiscal implications of
the proposed reformulation.
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21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
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Pyatt (1992b) argues this point which i~ taken.up i~McC!i.llivray
et al. (1995) and by Srinavasan (1994) m a swmgemg critique of
the IIDI.
Streeton (1994) makes a similar point. For my own part, I ~m not
persuaded by this neat footwork and regard the IIDI as a distrac-
tion.
Perhaps we cannot, since Streeton (1994) writes at length about
the difference between human resource developers and humani-
tarians as if these two groups were mutually exclusive.
They apply not only to developing countries but to developed
countries as well. One wonders what the historians will event-
ually say of the changes wrought in the UK over recent years.
In this connection they particularly mention UNDP (1992).
The colonial history of Ceylon was unique while the post-colo-
nial policies of the ethnic majority arguably were never entirely
admirable.
The World Bank must take some responsibility for having low-
ered standards of data integrity with its early publications on
income inequality. One might accept that it is admissible and
even helpful to publish the only data we have, but it is not
acceptable to then show little concern for the improvement of
those data and to use them selectively to draw inferences which
have little or no statistical significance. In this the World Devel-
opment Reports published by the World Bank (World Bank,
annual from 1978) has set an unfortunate precedent which the
UNDP is now following.
At one point in its brief history to date, the IIDI was com-
plemented by a Human Freedom Index. However, this has now
been withdrawn.
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